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ABSTRACT: This paper contrasts two views of the necessity to manifest the rational adequacy of 
argumentation. The view advanced by Ralph Johnson’s program for informal logic will be compared to one 
based on an account of obligations incurred in speech acts. Both views hold that arguers are commonly 
obliged to make it apparent that they are offering adequate support for their positions, but they differ in 
their accounts of the nature and scope of those obligations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
It seems apparent that there is a connection between the probative obligations (burdens of 
proof) which arguers incur and their need to make manifest the rational adequacy of the 
persuasive arguments they advance. This paper compares and contrasts two views of that 
connection. The first view, which I will refer to as the status view, holds that the necessity 
to manifest the rational adequacy of argumentation is inherent in the practice of 
argumentation and that arguers incur probative obligations in conjunction with that 
necessity.  According to this view, a speaker who purports to occupy the status of a 
practitioner of argumentation necessarily strives to manifest the rational quality of her 
argumentation and in doing so openly undertakes probative obligations (Johnson, 2000). 
This view has been ably expressed by Ralph Johnson. The second view, to be referred to 
as the interactionist view holds that the arguers find it pragmatically necessary to 
manifest the rational adequacy of their argumentation in interactions which generate and 
discharge probative obligations. This view finds its foundation in a Gricean view of the 
pragmatics of speech acts (Kauffeld, 1998). These views have a number of features in 
common. I will begin by elaborating key similarities between the status view and the 
interactionist view and will, then, proceed to delineate their differences and comment on 
their comparative adequacy. 
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2. MANIFESTING AN ARGUMENT’S RATIONALITY AND THE ARGUER’S 
PROBATIVE OBLIGATIONS  
 
Let us begin with several key points of agreement shared by the two views in question. 
First, both views focus on persuasive argumentation and hold, though on somewhat 
different grounds, that (competent) persuasive arguers commonly strive not just to 
provide rationally adequate arguments but also to manifest the adequacy of their 
argumentation. Second, both views recognize that arguers commonly incur probative 
obligations, i.e., the burden of providing good reasons for the propositions they put 
forward for consideration and acceptance and (in many cases) the further obligation to 
answer questions, objections, doubts, etc. As we will see the two views in question arrive 
at these common observations from somewhat different perspectives.  
Ralph Johnson holds that the practice of argumentation is characterized by 
manifest rationality: “it is patently and openly rational . . . . [T]he participants . . . agree to 
do nothing that would compromise either the substance or the appearance of rationality” 
(Johnson, 2000 p. 163). As he later explains “. . . . participants in the practice of 
argumentation not only exercise their rationality but they need to be seen to be doing so” 
(p. 164). “Manifest rationality,” in Johnson’s view, is characteristic of the practice of 
argumentation as conducted within an ideally rational community of arguers (p. 163). 
Philosophical argumentation provides Johnson’s exemplar for such a practice.  
In Johnson’s view the arguer’s probative obligations, what lawyers would call her 
burden of proof, inhere in the demands of manifest rationality. Thus Ralph Johnson holds 
 
The requirements of manifest rationality make it obligatory that, if I wish to persuade you of the 
truth or the acceptability of some thesis-statement and wish to do so in accordance with the 
dictates of rationality, recognizing your rationality, then I must give reasons . . . advanced in 
support of the conclusion; what others call the premises of the argument. (p. 165)  
 
To this he adds the further observation that there will in all likelihood be “objections to 
the argument, whether to the thesis-target assertion, the reasons supporting or both. 
Realizing this, the arguer, who we are supposing is rational, is under a rational obligation 
to address these dialectical dimension: alternative positions, and standard objections” (p. 
165).  
The interactionist view holds that in a variety of communicative acts, such as 
proposing, accusing, advising, exhorting, answering criticisms, insisting, etc. speaker’s 
openly incur probative obligations as a matter of pragmatic efforts to establish conditions 
under which arguments can function persuasively (Goodwin, 2001; Kauffeld, 1998). In 
this view arguers find it necessary to manifest the rational quality of their arguments in 
order to make it apparent that they are fulfilling their probative obligations. So, for 
example, in making a proposal a speaker typically puts forward a proposition for 
consideration, and in order to induce her addressee to at least tentatively consider that 
proposition, the proposer openly commits herself to providing good reasons on its behalf 
and to answering her addressee’s doubts, objections, etc. Often, where a proposer is able 
to manifestly discharge that commitment, she is able create a body of argument which her 
addressee believes merits serious consideration and which the addressee ought to 
consider in making relevant decisions. Here the proposer’s burden of proof arises out of 
the pragmatics of her interaction with her addressee, and the necessity to manifest the 
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quality of her argumentation is a matter of her need to make it apparent that she is 
fulfilling her openly incurred probative obligation.  
The observation which these two points of view have in common, viz., that 
competent arguers commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the 
rational quality of their argumentation, can readily be illustration by critical examination 
of much competent argumentation. Consider, for example, the introductory passage to 
Martin Luther King’s brilliant “Letter from Birmingham Jail.”1  Addressing his “fellow 
clergymen,” King wrote,  
 
While confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement calling my 
present activities ‘unwise and untimely.” Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of my work and 
ideas. If I sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little 
time for anything other than such correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no 
time for constructive work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will and that your 
criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statements in what I hope will be 
patient and reasonable terms (2003, pp. 777).  
 
Here King openly undertakes an obligation to respond in “patient and reasonable terms” 
to the criticism directed at his actions by fellow clergymen. His letter is conspicuously 
reasonable in its argumentation. His effort to manifest the rational quality of his argument 
is reflected in his concluding statement.  
 
If I have said anything in this letter that overstates the truth and indicates and unreasonable 
impatience, I beg you to forgive me. If I have said anything that understates the truth and indicates 
my having a patience that allows me to settle for anything less than brotherhood, I beg God to 
forgive me (p. 794).  
 
These features of King’s “Letter”—his openly undertaking a probative obligation and his 
patent attempt to make manifest the rational quality of his argument—have clear parallels 
in many instance of competent persuasive argumentation. 
Recognition of the fact that in competent persuasive argumentation, speakers 
commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the rational quality of their 
argumentation sets the status view and the interactionist view apart from several other 
approaches to the study of argumentation. It distinguishes them in the first instance from 
the approach taken by Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. As I argue elsewhere, their 
New Rhetoric holds that a speaker’s selection of arguments is governed fundamentally by 
what we might call the Principle of Maxim Audience Adaptation (Kauffeld, 1995). 
Regarding the principles which might guide a competent advocate in her selection of 
arguments and proofs, they bluntly hold, "There is only one rule in this matter:  
adaptation to the audience whatever its nature" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
25).  This view relegates consideration of the quality of available arguments to a 
secondary role in the speaker's determination of which to use in her discourse. Matters 
pertaining to the quality of reasons and arguments include the truth of available premises, 
the validity and cogency of inferences, their relevance to the issues, their bearing on the 
addressee's substantial interests and concerns, etc. The Principle of Maximum Audience 
Adaptation relegates such considerations of quality to secondary status at best; following 
                                                 
1 For a concise history of the context of King’s “Letter” and an insightful discussion of it structure see: 
Leff, M. (203). 
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the maxim a speaker’s primary question is simply which arguments is my audience likely 
accept. Whereas, it seems that in much competent persuasive discourse a speaker’s 
selection of arguments would be guided by a need to identify reasons and evidence the 
rational quality of which she can make apparent to her addressees.  
Secondly, the status view and the interactionist view differ from accounts of 
persuasive argumentation which construe the arguer’s burden of proof simply as a matter 
of the would-be-persuader’s need to provide reasons in order to secure agreement, assent, 
and/or consideration from his addressee (Baird, 1950, p. 26; Cronkhite, 1966, pp 273-
276; Ehninger & Brockriede, 1966, pp. 81-83). Such views regard arguments in 
simplistically practical terms and fail to recognize that commonly arguers do incur 
probative obligations; the arguer’s burden of proof in many cases is an obligation to 
provide reason and evidence is support of her position.  
Finally we should note that the status and the interactionist views contrast with 
what we might call an “institutional view” of probative burdens. The latter, dominant in 
much study of argumentation since Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, attempt to illuminate 
ordinary burdens of proof primarily by analogy to the institutionally regimented 
distributions of probative obligations found in courts of law (Whately, 1963, pp. 112-
132). While there is much to be learned from such analogies, both the status and the 
interactionist views, as instanced in the literature under discussion here, hold that 
accounts of probative obligations outside the courts should be built up primarily from 
within the study of argumentation as ordinarily practiced and should not be simply 
modeled on institutionalized legal practices (Johnson, 2000, pp. 48-49; Kauffeld, 1998).  
 
3. COMPARISON OF THE STATUS AND THE INTERACTIONIST VIEWS 
 
Let us now briefly sketch and then compare these perspectives on manifest rationality and 
the arguer’s probative responsibilities. The basic question here is how well each 
constructively illuminates these normative features of argumentation. That is, how well 
does each fit with and explain the fact that competent arguers commonly incur probative 
obligations and attempt to manifest the rational adequacy of their argumentation?  And, 
beyond that question, how well does each enhance our understanding of the normative 
basis of argumentation? We start with the status view and proceed to the interactionist 
view.  
The status view presents manifest rationality and the arguer’s probative burdens 
as products of expectations that arise within a set of “shared social understandings” 
which, according to this view, enable the “practice of argumentation” (Johnson, 2000, p. 
155). Exactly what those social understandings are and, indeed, determining what the 
“practice of argumentation consists” in is a major project for Ralph Johnson and for 
others inclined toward the status view of manifest rationality, and it may be that 
conceiving of argumentation as a practice ultimately proves to be a happy way to 
approach the study and conduct of arguments. However, our immediate concern is not 
with this larger project but with the specific doctrines Professor Johnson has advanced 
relating the practice of argumentation to manifest rationality and the arguer’s probative 
burdens.  
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Johnson conceives of a practice along lines inspired by Alasdiar MacIntyre (1984, 
pp. 187-203).  In MacIntyre/Johnson’s view a practice is:    
 
(i) a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity (examples:  the 
games of football and chess; architecture, farming; the inquiries of physics, chemistry, biology, 
history; in medieval times the sustaining of human communities; broadly: arts, sciences, games, 
the sustaining of human families).  
 
(ii) through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized (examples: goods internal to 
chess include a particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination, competitive intensity; as 
contrast with goods external to chess such as winning a prize for participating or for being 
victorious; portrait painting has the internal good of showing how the face at any age is the face 
that the subject of the portrait deserves). (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 189)  
 
A critical feature of Johnson’s view of argumentation as a practice is the priority 
he assigns to rationality as the primary internal good realized though the activity of 
argumentation. Of the goods internal to the activity of argumentation, he writes:  
 
The goods internal to the activity are generally an increase in rationality and specially a deeper 
understanding, and-or being rationally persuaded, and-or coming closer to an acceptable position. 
(p. 155),  
 
An argument depends on the Other for its success and well-being. To understand this, we must go 
back to the practice of argumentation and be reminded of its purpose(s). The fundamental purpose, 
although admittedly not the only one, is to arrive at the truth about some issue. The practice exists 
because everyone realizes that to achieve that goal, they need to reason; they need to give reasons 
and then access them. (p. 158).  
 
Consistent with this emphasis on promoting rationality Johnson offers the 
following characterization of those fully committed to the practice of argumentation.  
 
(i) They are devoted to rationality: “To engage in the practice, the participants must embrace and 
endorse and to some degree cherish rationality. . . . Argumentation shares with other rational 
processes—like proving and theorizing—the requirement that nothing be accepted but what is 
shown to have reason behind it.” (p. 162)  
 
(ii) Their primary aim is to increase rationality: “As a result of engaging in the practice of 
argumentation, the participants are more rational and the amount of rationality in the world has 
increased. The arguer and the critic have each exercised reasoning powers. . . . As a result of each 
instance of argumentation, then, the world has become a slightly more rational place” (p. 162).  
 
(iii) The practitioner of argumentation exhibits rationality. “It is not just that the participants 
embrace rationality, which they might do secretly but not publicly. No, the participants in the 
practice exhibit what it is to be rational. To give reasons; to weigh objections; to revise over them 
or to reject them—all of this describes a vintage performance of rationality.”  Correspondingly, 
practitioners of argumentation regard breaches of rationality as “shocking.” (pp. 162-3)  
 
It is relatively easy to see, how given these characteristics, the practitioners of 
argumentation would each want to and find it necessary to manifest the rationality of 
their argumentation. Each cherishes rationality and regards her argumentation as an 
opportunity to exhibit the rationality of her arguments, and she would scorn failures of 
rationality in the argumentation of her co-practitioners. She likewise expects that they 
similarly cherish rationality and will strive to exhibit the rationality of their 
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argumentation, scorning any failures of rationality in hers. In these circumstances there 
arises a mutual expectation that arguers will not only present arguments which are 
rational but will also strive to manifest the rationality of their argumentation. Indeed, in 
these circumstances arguers will have reason to rely on each other to manifest the 
rationality of each others argumentation.  
Does this view of manifest rationality support an account of how arguers may 
incur probative obligations both to give good reasons in support of the propositions to 
which they try to persuade others and also to answer doubts and objections raised by 
critics to the argument? 
Although Professor Johnson has written at length about the arguer’s obligations 
and especially her dialectical obligations, he has not to my knowledge committed himself 
to any specific analysis of “obligation.” However, at this point we may turn to analysis of 
obligation developed by the English philosopher Geoffrey Warnock. Professor Warnock 
argues convincingly that obligations are incurred where:  (i) it is foreseeable that others 
will suffer or will continue to suffer harm in the event the obligee does not act;  (ii) others 
are counting on his or her acting in order to avert, prevent, ameliorate, or rectify that 
harm; and (iii) he or she must so act in order to avoid speaking or having spoken or even 
having acted falsely (Warnock, 1971, pp. 94-117). This is a somewhat more specific 
sense of ‘obligation’ than one sometimes encounters. We sometimes speak of an 
“obligation” in the broad sense of an act which one ought to do, and we sometimes speak 
vaguely of obligations in ways which approximate our sense of ‘duty’ (for example: 
Gewirth, 1978, pp. 135-137; Sher, 1987, pp. 196-197). But it is clear that there are many 
things which one has a strong reason to do, and thus ought to do, but one is not bound to 
do in the sense of having an obligation to do them. As George Sher observes, when we 
say that an especially hard-working self-employed farmer deserves to succeed or a person 
of fine moral character ought to fare well (and even suppose that we ought to support 
their efforts), we typically do not mean that anyone is obligated to take steps to provide 
what is deserved (Sher, 1987, p. 5). Similarly beneficence often indicates that we ought 
help this or that person, though we may be under no obligation to do so (Warnock, 1971, 
p. 94). While duties often give rise to obligations, the latter require some action which 
tacitly or explicitly commits the obligee, such as accepting an office to which specific 
duties are attached (Rawls, 1971, pp. 114-115; Warnock, 1971, p. 116). Thus, in 
Warnock’s view, a promisor is obligated to do what she has promised because (a) others 
are counting on her to so act, (b) would be frustrated in their coordinated actions should 
the promise not be kept, and (c) the promisor has given the promisees to believe that she 
will so act, if only because she said she would.  
Given Warnock’s analysis of obligation, it seem clear that a speaker who presents 
herself as a practitioner of argumentation in Johnson’s terms—who purports to cherish 
argumentation, to increase and to exhibit rationality in her argumentation—will incur an 
obligation to both provide good arguments for her position and answer doubts and 
objections to that position:  (1) other practitioners are expecting her, indeed relying on her 
to provide arguments of manifestly good quality and to exhibit the rationality of her 
position by answering doubts and objections, (2) they will suffer harm should she fail to 
live up to their expectations, partly in that their valued practice of argumentation will not 
have served to increase the amount of rationality and partly by being shocked and 
disturbed by her failure, and (3) the arguer herself will have acted falsely in that by 
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purporting to be a practitioner of argumentation, she generated the expectations which 
have not been satisfied.  
At this point in the discussion, then, we should recognize that Johnson’s version 
of the status view does afford an explanation for why the practitioner of argumentation 
(when addressing other practitioners) would both find it necessary to manifest the 
rationality of her argumentation and would incur probative obligations. There are, 
however, two closely related weaknesses to this account as it applies to the fact that 
competent arguers commonly incur probative obligations and strive to manifest the 
rationality of their arguments.  
From a normative point of view, a strength of Johnson’s account is its emphasis 
on rationality as an internal good realized through the practice of argumentation. 
Undoubtedly the capacity of argumentation to yield conclusions well founded on rational 
grounds is among its most important values. However, given the fallibility of human 
agents, rationality in argumentation is not the unalloyed primary good that Johnson’s 
view of the practice of argumentation suggests. Here it is helpful to recall that when 
Martin Luther King undertook the probative obligations which initiated his “Letter from 
the Birmingham Jail,” he first announced that it was not his habit to answer all the 
criticism which crossed his desk for he then “would have no time for constructive work.” 
This remark may serve as a healthy reminder that the exercise of reason in argumentation 
requires substantial commitments of scarce cognitive resources; prudent individuals are 
unlikely to commit themselves to such exercises unless they foresee a good chance that 
the effort will result in some positive outcome (Pratkanis & Aronson, 1992, p. 38). They 
will often be unwilling or very reluctant to commit the time, research, and expenditure of 
effort required by argumentation without some strong assurance that the argumentation 
will be conducted within limits that enable an outcome which warrants the effort. In 
addition, argumentation often puts the arguer at considerable risk. Johnson, himself, 
recognizes that even among the well intentioned arguing is a risky business: “But it is 
also known full well that intellectual imaginations may be limited, that there may be a 
failure to see certain limitations in the arguments produced. In eagerness, certain items of 
evidence may be overrated and others may be underrated or ignored” (p. 158).2 
Reflecting this simple fact that rationality as exercised in argumentation by fallible 
persons is an imperfect instrument, addressees may regard arguments addressed to them 
as potentially meddlesome, misguided intrusions into their affairs. Similarly, person 
suspected of wrongdoing may prudently doubt whether their answers to the complaints 
brought against them will receive fair and dispassionate consideration. Then, too, even 
flattering arguments may seem to pose a distasteful potential to distort one’s own self-
regard. Rationality for all its inherent value is subject to abuse, error and misapplication, 
even among the well intentioned. 
Given the liabilities of rationality, it should come as no surprise that in a great 
many cases persons who value argumentation and regard as it an potentially useful 
process are, nonetheless, unwilling to undertake the fulsome commitment rationality 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that Professor Johnson makes this observation about the vulnerability of argumentation 
to error in the course of pointing up the importance of dialectical responses which can serve to correct the 
errors made by the argument’s initial sponsor. While it is true that dialectical exchanges may serve to 
correct errors; it is also the case that the responses a critic makes to one’s argument may be no less subject 
to error than one’s initial statement. 
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Johnson attributes to the practitioner of argument. King, it will be recalled, restricts 
himself to defending the wisdom and timeliness of his actions as leader of non-violent 
protests at Birmingham; he does not commit himself to answering all criticisms addressed 
to his cause, and he commits himself only to such exercise of reason as is consistent with 
recognition that years of racial injustices warrant considerable impatience. King’s 
example is not unique. In a great many cases a speaker’s willingness to undertake a 
burden of proof is prudently (and reasonably) qualified by considerations which seriously 
limit the speaker’s interest in “increasing the total rationality of human affairs.” Parties 
putting forward propositions for consideration and manifestly willing to defend their 
positions commonly restrict their commitment to respond to only to those questions and 
objections which recognize the urgency of the matter or, alternatively, to those which 
respect the preliminary state of the project. Persons to whom potentially meddlesome 
argument are addressed may require a commitment from the arguer to consider the matter 
primarily in terms of their concerns. Persons suspected of wrong-doing may require 
special commitments regarding the fairness of the argumentation in which they are 
invited to participate. And parties to whom laudatory arguments are addressed may 
require special assurance regarding a speaker’s motivations. Very commonly in day-to-
day argumentation the probative obligations which enable argumentation to do useful 
work require that the speaker restrict, qualify, or otherwise limit her commitment to 
rationality in ways which are not compatible with the commitment which, according to 
Johnson, identify a speaker as a practitioner of argumentation.  
It is important to be clear about the difficulty these considerations pose for 
Johnson’s account of the arguer’s probative obligations and, indeed, for all status views 
of those obligations. The problem is not just that Johnson fails to recognize that 
argumentation serves many ends and that it may be associated with many goods besides 
rationality. The difficulty is that Johnson’s status view cannot account for many of the 
probative obligations arguers do ordinarily incur, nor does it cast much light on how 
those obligations are undertaken. As we have seen, in Johnson’s view a speaker incurs 
probative obligations by presenting herself as a practitioner of argumentation, i.e., as one 
who cherishes rationality, openly embraces and endorse rationality, accepting nothing but 
what is shown to have reason behind it, striving to maximize the amount of rationality in 
the world, scorning limitations on the exercise of rationality, and seeking to exhibit what 
it is to be rational. It is this self-representation which warrants the supposition that she 
will have acted or spoken falsely should she fail to satisfy her probative obligations and, 
so, seals her commitment as an obligation. This account may be satisfactory for some 
kinds of argumentation, i.e., argumentation exchanged among persons who share a 
similar conception of the practice of argumentation and for whom rationality is the 
primary good to be pursued. But given the fallibility of persons, the vulnerability of 
rationality to abuse and error, and the prudential costs of argumentation, many arguers 
would, like Martin Luther King, avoid openly undertaking the sweeping commitment to 
rationality which for Johnson identifies the practitioner of argumentation. Accordingly, 
on Johnson’s account they would not in good faith be able to undertake the probative 
obligations which, in fact, many arguers do authentically incur on a day-to-day basis.  
The problem for Johnson’s account of manifest rationality and probative 
obligation is that it makes the self-representation required to engage the arguer’s burden 
of proof categorical:  the arguer represents herself as a member of a category of persons 
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with a specific and identifying set of commitments to rationality; whereas, many of the 
burdens of proof incurred by persons on a day-to-day basis in the actual practice of 
argumentation are variable depending on the problems, opportunities, risks, etc. which 
persons reasonably and prudently anticipate and encounter when they engage in arguing 
with one another. Nor is it readily apparent that a party representing herself as a 
practitioner of argumentation has room to modify the probative burden she is expected to 
accept. However she identifies herself, if that identification suffices to mark her as a 
practitioner of argumentation, her fellow practitioners are thereupon entitled to expect 
that she shares their regard for and commitment to rationality, and relying on this 
expectation they will suffer harm should she fail to accept and live up to that burden, and 
it will be the case that she has acted falsely if she fails to conform her behaviour to this 
expectation. On Johnson’s account, once one purports to occupy the status of practitioner 
of argumentation, a corresponding full fledged and unqualified obligation to promote 
rationality descends on the arguer. 
Let us turn now to the interactionist’s view of the arguer’s probative obligations 
and to its account of her need to manifest the rationality of her position. This view also 
traces the genesis of an arguer’s probative burdens to socially established expectations, 
but it presents a very different picture of those expectations and of how and why they 
arise. Like the status view, the interactionist regards argumentation as a useful practice 
capable of bringing reason and evidence to bear on the resolution of a many matters, but 
unlike the status view, the interaction perspective does not suppose a priori that 
argumentation is governed by an overriding commitment to rationality which identifies 
its practitioners and dictates their probative obligations. Rather the interactionist analyzes 
the kinds communicative exchanges in which arguers incur probative obligations with 
special attention to how those commitments are undertaken, how they may be realigned 
in particular cases, how they vary from one kind of interaction to another, and the 
pragmatic roles which probative obligations play in argumentation.  
Thus, the interactionist observes that in many communicative acts, e. g., 
proposing, responding to criticism, (some varieties of) advising, speakers deliberately and 
openly accept probative obligations, while in many others, e. g., accusing, insisting, 
exhorting, criticizing, they place themselves in positions at which they can be called upon 
to undertake probative obligations. As noted above, the proposer typically puts forward a 
proposition for (tentative) consideration and openly commits herself both to providing 
reasons which justify its acceptance and to answering her addressee’s doubts and 
objections. The accuser, typically, demands an answer to her allegations of wrong doing 
and, by openly committing herself to treating the accused fairly, places herself in a 
position where she must accept an obligation to support her allegations should she be 
called upon to do so. The advisor openly commits herself to speaking out of regard for 
her addressee’s concerns, and she may also openly undertake to provide reasons for 
following her advice. King, it will be recalled, explicitly committed himself to answering 
the criticisms of his actions in patient and reasonable terms. In these and similar 
communicative exchanges, arguers incur probative burdens which satisfy Warnock’s 
conception of obligations: the arguer says and does things which foreseeably provide her 
addressees with a basis for relying upon her to provide reason and evidence of a specific 
quality; the addressees will suffer corresponding harm should she fail to live up to those 
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expectations; and she will have spoken or acted falsely if argumentation does not fulfill 
her commitment. 
The probative obligations speakers undertake interactively make are related in 
various ways to presumptions which warrant participation in reason-giving exchanges 
which otherwise might not be possible (Kauffeld, 1998). Under favourable 
circumstances, the proposer’s probative commitment warrants a presumption that what 
she has to say may prove to merit serious consideration and, so, may provide an 
addressee with reason to engage in dialogue about and give careful consideration to 
propositions which he otherwise might suppose not worth a serious cognitive investment. 
Similarly, the accuser’s commitment to treat the accused fairly and her concomitant 
willingness to substantiate her allegations may suffice to oblige the accused to participate 
in a discussion which the accused would otherwise avoid. The advisor’s open 
commitment to speak out of regard for her addressee’s concerns and, accordingly, frame 
her arguments from that perspective may serve to warrant a presumption to the effect that 
her arguments will not be meddlesome and, so, serve to engage the attention of an 
addressee who would otherwise ignore her arguments. King’s probative commitments 
seem well designed to warrant a presumption that his answers rise above a context of 
inflamed and impassioned diatribes and, so, merit careful and thoughtful consideration.  
Here we can see a comparative strength of the interactionist views of probative 
obligation. Where the status view presents rationality as the prime good in argumentation 
and seems to neglect the various reasons why persons may be reluctant to engage in 
argumentation principally designed to promote rationality, the interactionist view brings 
to attention ways in which the allocation of probative obligations can serve to provide 
persons with reason to participate fruitfully in rational argumentation. An interactionist 
view enables us to see how in much day-to-day argumentation an appropriate distribution 
of probative obligations enables persons to square the value of reasoned discourse with 
practical consideration of time and urgency, fairness, independence of decision-making, 
and so on.  
Moreover, an interactionist view helps us to understand some of the importance of 
manifest rationality in argumentation, and this in two respects. First, the interactionist 
view calls attention to the fact that commonly speakers deliberately and openly commit 
themselves to providing rational support for propositions they put forward for acceptance 
and, also, to answering doubts, objections, counter-arguments, etc. They do so for good 
practical reasons related to the possibility of engaging others in argumentation. Second, 
by manifesting the rational adequacy of their arguments, speakers can conspicuously and 
openly discharge the probative obligations they incur, and in many cases, as I have 
argued elsewhere, manifestly fulfilling those obligations has considerable pragmatic 
value (Kauffeld, 2002). King’s address provides an interesting example of the pragmatic 
value of conspicuously discharging a probative obligation. His letter falls into two parts. 
The first responds to the criticism directed against him by fellow clergymen (pp. 777-
784). It provides a carefully reasoned body of argument which persuasively vindicates the 
protest activity for which he had been criticized and which very plausibly defends his 
status as patient, sincere and well intentioned Christian minister—a fellow clergyman. 
Having presumptively discharged his initial probative obligation, the second part of his 
letter expresses his disappointment with the failure of his white ministerial brothers, and 
of “moderates” in general, to support non-violent protest activities on the behalf of black 
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civil rights (pp. 784-794). The overall structure of his appeal repeats this form:  King 
expresses his disappointment at the failure of the white clergy to support this or that 
aspect of Black demands and actions for civil rights. He purports to have expected their 
support as a matter of their avowal of Christian doctrines. Having presumptively 
established his status as a patient and reasonable man of good faith, King uses that status 
as platform from which to impose an obligation on his fellow clergy to answer for their 
failure to support his cause. He is suffering harm in the form of profound disappointment, 
resulting from that failure on their part to fulfill expectations, which they as professed 
Christian leaders had aroused in King’s breast. So, the interactionist view sheds light on 
the arguers need to manifest the rationality of her arguments.  
Now, we come to what might be regarded as a troubling aspect of the 
interactionist view, for it may seem that the interactionist fails to support a sufficiently 
rigorous normative conception of the burden of proof. Legal conceptions of the burden of 
proof hold up a model which offers relatively clear conceptions of when in, for example, 
criminal cases the prosecution will have discharged its burden of proof, viz., when the 
prosecution has established the defendant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. 
Johnson’s (initial) formulation of the status view of an arguer’s probative obligation is 
even more rigorous. The arguer is obliged to provide positive reason for the 
proposition(s) she want accepted and to answer all doubts, objections, etc. known to her 
and to others (Johnson, 2000, pp. 269-270). The interactionist view also supports a 
normative conception of the arguer’s probative obligation, but it’s conception is far less 
rigid than some legal conceptions or the status conception developed by Johnson. Indeed, 
the interactionist’s strength depends upon the possibility of engaging probative 
obligations appropriate to the nature of the argumentation at hand and the circumstances 
in which it will be conducted. Accordingly, a proposer will typically commit herself to 
answer all doubts and objections which in the circumstances merit consideration, and 
under conditions of urgency this standard may allow her to dismiss many objections, 
which in other circumstances might be considered quite important. Similarly, an advisor 
speaking in an imperative mode might accept a probative obligation limited to showing 
that such and such a course of action is required by what the advisee should regard as an 
overriding concern. Similarly, we have seen that King limited his probative obligations to 
questions concerning whether his actions were timely and wise. This apparent variation in 
the normative standards associated with probative responsibilities negotiated in the 
course of argumentative interaction may seem to lack the rigor necessary to ensure 
epistemic reliability.  
I am unsure as to the extent of difficulty posed by the preceding concern. No 
doubt allocations of probative responsibility are subject to abuse. Richard Gaskin’s has 
shown that there is a possibility in some situations of advocates attempting to win a 
decision by imposing on the other side a burden of proof which could not be satisfied 
regardless of the merits of the opposing position’s argumentation (Gaskins, 1992). And 
there can be no doubt that much contemporary advertising attempts to induce 
consideration of product purchases on be basis of deceptive probative commitments. On 
the other hand, the probative obligations incurred in paradigm cases of various 
communicative acts do commit advocates to rigorous argumentation. The proposer’s 
commitment to provide a case which merits serious consideration imposes a demanding 
standard on her argumentation. Moreover, the question of how comprehensive an 
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arguer’s probative burdens ought be is more complicated than might at first appear. 
Students of argumentation are accustomed to think of argumentation as a process which 
terminates in a judgment, decision, or consensus. Accordingly we conceive of an 
allocation of probative burdens spanning a bounded process such as a court proceeding, 
an academic debate, or regulated dialogue. In “real life” much argumentation is far more 
fragmentary than our idealized processes suggest. King’s “Letter” constitutes one episode 
in a dialogue about race and social action which continues to the present. It explicitly 
aims at tolerance for and understanding of certain protest activities; its likely immediate 
result was to get some people to begin to rethink their views. The question of what are 
epistemically satisfactory probative commitments, then, is a complicated one—one which 
requires far more study and investigation.  
Finally, I should like to briefly address the question of whether a status view of 
manifest rationality and an interactionist view can be merged. Perhaps, one might be 
inclined to think, the flexibility of the interactionist view could be given more spine, so to 
speak, were it merged with a status view along the lines put forward by Johnson. If the 
relevant status is taken to be the status of a practitioner of argumentation, such a merger 
is not easy to conceive. Such a proposal could only achieve sufficient generality by 
attaching some minimal core probative obligation to the very act of attempting to produce 
an argument. In view of the range of purposes argumentation serves and the variety of 
circumstances under which it is conducted, I doubt that such a universal core 
commitment could be formulated which assured much rigor in argumentation. There are, 
however, other ways in which considerations of status may enter the picture. King 
addresses his argumentation to sincere persons of good will. Insofar as his arguments 
qualify as considerations which merit the attention of sincere persons of good will, then 
failure to address his views leaves persons vulnerable to questions about whether they are 
indeed such properly motivated persons. In the eighteenth century, gentlemen commonly 
addressed their arguments to a “candid audience” and presented themselves as persons of 
candour, i.e., persons willing to attend carefully and respond reasonably to opposing 
views. Failure to conduct oneself in this fashion raised the possibility of being criticized 
for lack of candour, and that criticism was often taken seriously (Furtwangler, 1979). In 
these instances a general status related to civility figures into the conception and 
enforcement of argumentative commitments. Were we to find ways to merge status 
considerations in our conception of argumentative obligations, the productive merger 
would, I suspect, involve concepts of status having to do with civility and proper respect 
for persons and not specifically with the practice of argumentation. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
This paper has compared a status account of the connections between manifest rationality 
and the arguer’s probative burdens with the account given from an interactionist 
perspective. According to the former, persons purporting to be practitioners of 
argumentation attempt to, and are expected to, exhibit the rationality of their 
argumentation, while regarding the promotion of rationality as the primary internal good 
of their practice. As a consequence of this commitment, “practitioners of argumentation” 
incur an obligation both to provide good reasons for the propositions they put forward for 
acceptance and to answer questions and objections addressed to them. According to an 
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interactionist view, arguers deliberately and openly undertake probative obligations 
strategically in order to generate presumptions which warrant participation in 
argumentative interactions. In this view arguers take pains to manifest the rationality of 
their argumentation because by so doing (a) they openly and strategically undertake 
probative obligations and (b) they make it apparent that they are fulfilling those 
obligations. The status view, I have argued, has a limited capacity to account for the 
probative obligations incurred in day-to-day argumentation because it does afford the 
“practitioner of argumentation” with means to adapt her probative commitments to the 
complexities of the situations in which argumentation occurs. The interactionist view, on 
the other hand, affords insight into how arguers use the resources of manifest rationality 
to create circumstances in which argumentation can function.  
 
link to commentary
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